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In his 1919 Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy Bertrand Russell said:
…so long as names are used as names, ‘Scott is Sir Walter’ is the same trivial 
proposition as ‘Scott is Scott.’” 
This echoes the opening paragraph of Gottlob Frege's "Sinn und Bedeutung": 
If the sign 'a' is distinguished from the sign 'b' only as an object (here, by means of
its shape), not as a sign (i.e. not by the manner in which it designates something), 
the cognitive value of  a=a becomes essentially equal to that of  a=b, provided  
a=b is true.
This postulate of  propositional sameness1 is a key unspoken premise of Russell's "On
Denoting".  Throughout  their  competing  analyses  of  singular  terms  this  postulate  is
common background for Frege, Russell and most all their successors, for they assume the
basic Principle of Synonym Substitution that synonym substitution preserves sentence
sense. The postulate has nothing going for it other than the seeming self-evidence of the
general  principle,  which  comes  from  the  very  meaning  of  the  term  'synonymy'.
Notoriously,  synonym  subbing  might  shift  sentence  sense  and  truth  value  when  the
resultant sentence refers to one of the terms in some way, either directly as in  'Greece'
has three 'e''s/'Hellas has three 'e''s , or indirectly when the term represents a semantic
object -- the semantic content of speech or thought -- as in He said (thought) that Greece
is  Hellas. Elsewhere,  synonym  subbing  can't  affect  a  sentence's  factual  content.
Necessarily, the same objects are denoted and the same properties are predicated of them;
the same language-neutral reality is asserted. And for Frege, Russell, Quine, Kripke,  et
al., the semantic content they care about -- an utterance's propositional content, its truth
conditions -- just is or is wholly identified by its factual content.2 For them, truths tell us
only the facts they state.
Curiously,  from "Sinn und Bedeutung" to Kripke's 'A Puzzle About Belief'  and
beyond, the literature on the semantics of singular terms has been peculiarly dominated
by the postulated propositional sameness of self-identity sentences, form a=a, with true
alter-identity  sentences,  form  a=b.  It  seems  assumed  that  the  Synonym  Substitution
Principle has special import for singular terms, and especially in identity sentences. Yet,
for all that gets said, we could just as well say that Scott is dead or Sir Walter is not dead
is the same trivial proposition as Scott is dead or Scott is not dead -- or any other instance
of nonuniform substituting of coreferential singular terms in a logical truth. Further, the
Principle seems equally applicable to co-predicates so if  Grecian and Hellenic have the
same meaning, then the sentence, If it's Grecian, it's Hellenic, "expresses the same trivial
proposition as"  If it's Grecian, it's Grecian. Certainly their factual is identical. So how
could their semantic content differ? 
There seems no obvious way that  substitution in self-identities could teach us
anything more about singular term semantics than co-designator subbing in other logical
1
 It would be better called a claim of propositional identity were this not likely to get confused with the 
entrenched talk of identity propositions: i.e., propositions expressed in sentences of the form a=a or a=b.
2
 Facts can be individuated in various ways. One may say that 'Ted will arrive at 5:17' and 'Ted arrived at 
5:17' state the same fact from different temporal perspectives. One may also say they state different truths. 
They are translated differently. And they differ epistemologically; with different justifications for asserting 
them and thinking them true. 
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truths would. Nor is it evident how the general  Synonym Substitution Principle could
have  implications  for  singular  term  semantics  that  weren't  also  implications  for  the
semantics of any term, or any word. 
Actually, the salient semantic data and the deeper puzzles about them are much
the same for any logical truth and what I call its synomic interceptions. An interception is
the product (or process) of nonuniform substitution in a logical truth of a term or sentence
pivotal to  the  original  sentence's  expressing  a  truth  of  logic.  In  the  logical  truth  of
p→(pvq) and (p&q)→p, 'p' is pivotal but 'q' is not. Nonuniform substitution of 'r' for 'p'
alters the sentence's logical form; the necessity of the truth is preserved and explained by
'r' and 'p' being synonymous. In contrast, substituting 'r' for 'q' preserves logical form, and
'r's  synonymy  with  'q'  is  inessential  for  the  interception's  truth  and  irrelevant  to  its
necessity. Notice: to be pivotal to a logical truth, what Frege calls the sign for a term or
sentence  must  recur  in  the  sentence.  Interception  substitution  cannot  be  nonuniform
unless the sign recurs in a truth secured by syntax alone.
An  interception  is  synomic when  the  necessity  of  the  interception  truth  is
explained by the semantic equivalence of the signs exchanged. Securing the necessity of
co-predicate interceptions requires sameness of intension as well as extension. To secure
the necessity of co-designator interceptions suffice that the terms are co-extensive, so co-
referent designators qualify as synomic. Interceptions of truths of sentential logic may be
exchanges of synonymous sentences. The principles are the same but we'll simplify and
speak only of substituting terms.3
Kripke takes some exception to this. He claims that denying the truth of a co-
predicate interception betrays some conceptual or linguistic deficiency, whereas deficient
extralinguistic, extra-conceptual knowledge may explain denials of co-designating proper
name  interceptions.  Kripke's  claim  is  curious  in  several  respects.  Kripke  contrasts
predicate  vs.  designator  interceptions.  He  doesn't  distinguish  interceptions  of  self-
identities from co-designator interceptions in other logical truths. 
Further, his reliance on the rickety distinction between linguistic and conceptual
knowledge versus other knowledge seems anachronistic and risky after Quine's critique. 
Anyway,  accepting  his  categories,  Kripke's  claim  is  implausible  when  comparing
predicates with their cognate common names. 'Azure is cobalt' (a=c) and 'Whatever is
azure  is  cobalt'  (x)(A→Cx)  are  mutually  entailing  and  equivalently  informative.
Restricting Kripke's claim to proper names doesn't help, since they may have cognate or
associated predicates. Greece is Hellas, Being Grecian is being Hellenic and Greeks are
Hellenes are also mutually entailing and equivalently informative.4
Kripke's  contrast  is  especially  surprising  since  the  generality  of  the  Synonym
Substitution Principle decisively makes his case that Frege's positing predicative senses
3
 Caveat: Synomic truths are not analytical definitions. 'Equilateral rectangle' is a description of the defining
features of a square, not another name like 'square', as 'Hellas' is another name like 'Greece'.
4
 Three points. First, Being Grecian is being Hellenic may be more informative than Greece is Hellas since 
being Grecian requires relating to Greece in only certain hard to specify ways. Second, the implicit 
reference to a concrete particular in the predicate sense of  'Grecian' and 'Greeks' may be less special than at
first appears, since causal and historical theories of the reference of natural kind terms suggest that the 
predicate sense of most if not all natural kind term involves reference to some concrete particular, such as 
our planet. (That Kripke makes his contrast while advocating such a theory is another curiosity.) Third, 
while semantic ties like that of Grecian to Greece can break or dissolve so their senses drift apart, it 
suffices that such ties be possible (let alone common) for Kripke's contrast to be irreparably blurred.
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for  proper  names does  nothing to  explain  the semantic  data.  Being Grecian is  being
Hellenic  is informative despite the co-predication of the same property, so why must –
and  how  could  --  the  informativeness  of  Greece  is  Hellas be  explained  by  some
predicative nonsynonymy of proper names? Indeed, if Grecian and Hellenic predicate the
same property, have the same connotation, same intension, shouldn't any predicate sense
of Greece be the same for Hellas? Such synonymy seems entailed by the metalinguistic
truisms that  Greece means Greece and  Hellas means Hellas, and necessarily Greece is
Hellas, so necessarily the property of meaning Greece is the property of meaning Hellas. 5
The  fact  is,  despite  the  apparent  self-evidence  of  the  Synonym  Substitution
Principle,  despite the synonymy of an interception's  terms, and despite a logical  truth
having the factual content of its synomic interceptions, and thus the same truth value in
all  possible  worlds,  the  sentences  simply  don't  sound synonymous.  And  despite  our
befuddlement  trying  to  identify the semantic  difference  or  make good sense of  there
being a difference of sense, competent speakers distinctly sense a semantic difference.
The sentences differ phenomenologically. 
They  do,  for  they  differ  behaviorally.  These  sentence  pairs  are  not  used
interchangeably.  First  off,  simple synomic  interceptions  like  Greeks  are Hellenes are
commonly,  naturally  and  properly  used  to  communicate  the  semantic  fact  of  term
synonymy that explains the interception's truth. Only a recherché speech context could
justify reading an utterance of a logical sentence as suggesting anything at all about its
terms or their meanings.  
More, logical truths like Six is six, Sechs ist sechs, 6 is 6, VI is VI inter-translate
only with each other, while their synomic interceptions like Sechs is six, and 6 is VI don't
translate  each  other  or  any  logical  truth.6 The  best  translation  of  an  interception  is
contextually variable and sometimes controversial, but -- despite all the many famous
controversies about translations, including flat denials by famous logicians on this very
point – it's a plain fact of standard translation practice that synomic interceptions don't
translate logical truths.7
Indeed,  sameness  of factual  content  aside,  by  every test  of  synonymy,  logical
truths  and  synomic  interceptions  aren't  synonymous.  They're  not  even  close.  Their
5
 Frege's reasoning requires us to say that '6' and 'VI' cannot be synonymous C and thus that 6=6 and VI=VI 
cannot be synonymous -- unless the latter sentences are synonymous with 6=VI., which seems implausible since 
the self-identities are knowable without knowing the term meanings, whereas 6=VI  can't be true or knowable 
without the extralogical and extra-mathematical premise that these numerals are different names for the same 
number. Frege says that 'if what a definition has stipulated is subsequently expressed as an assertion, still its 
epistemic value is no greater than that of an example of the law of identity a=a.'  Thus, in a formal system 
'3+1=4' could represent a (stipulative) 'definitional equation' and would have the same 'epistemic value' 
[=cognitive value (?)] as '4=4'. ('On the Foundations of  Geometry: First Series' in  Brian McGuinness, ed., 
Gottlob Frege: Collected Papers (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984) 274.) This leaves wholly opaque what he meant by 
Sinn and in the same manner and epistemic value/cognitive value , for  how could the method of fixing reference
and synonymy affect matters? It doesn't with In any case, the proof of a synomic interception needs a premise 
absent from a proof of its logical correlate. Equally opaque is how Frege would explain the difference in 
cognitive and/or epistemic value between Greece is Hellas and Greeks are Hellenes or between Azure is cobalt' 
and  Everything  azure is cobalt.. 
6
 Translation, as I use the term, is a tighter relation than interchangeability. Given knowledge of the truth of 6 is 
six, VI is 6 and VI is six, the sentences may be informationally equivalent and thus pragmatically 
interchangeable, but only the latter translates VI ist sechs.
7
 Pace Alonzo Church, languages lacking a counterpart of the English 'fortnight' simply cannot translate the
English sentence 'A fortnight is a fourteen day period', not unless they borrow the English word.
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sentence meanings differ fundamentally and categorically.  That difference is a constant
whatever their terms may mean. The sentence nonsynonymy is entirely explained by the
syntactic difference between a truth explained by logical syntax alone and a correlative
truth explained by the semantic identity of the exchanged terms. 
The sentences are not interchangeable or intertranslatable because they state distinct
truths despite stating the same fact. They state the same fact, not because, as Frege, Godel,
and Davidson imagine, there can be at most only one fact. Their slingshot arguments with
that  conclusion are  reduction's  of  their  supposition that  synomic  interceptions  have  the
semantic  content  of  a  logical  truth.  Instead  the  point  is  that  truths  and  facts  differ
metaphysically.  Expressions  of  truths  differ  syntactically  from  expressions  of  facts.8
Although That S is true mutually entails That S is a fact, these that-S complements differ
syntactically. That NP VP is true transforms into 'NP VP' is true but not the ungrammatical
*NP's VPing is true, while That NP VP is a fact transforms into NP's VPing is a fact but not
the ungrammatical *'NP VP' is a fact.9  Sentences, statements, and truths are in one language
or another,  and are translatable into others.  Facts  are language-independent,10 language-
neutral entities, not themselves  in a language or translatable.  Facts mean, imply,  entail,
explain, prove, and justify things, but they do none of that in a language11.  We can infer
from the truth of Greece is Hellas that the terms Greece and Hellas corefer, but the fact of
Greece's being Greece is the  fact of Greece's being Hellas, and that fact is language-neutral,
so no semantic facts are inferable from it, but only from the distinct truths stating it. 
To  elaborate  this  explanation  of  the  sentence  nonsynonymy,  semantic  content
should  be  distinguished  from the  subsidiary  issue  cognitive  content.  A  theory  about
languages fit for science needs to take words, sentences and their meanings to be social
constants,  shared  abstractions.12 Unlike  its  meaning  or  semantic  content,  a  sentence's
informativeness -- its cognitive content or cognitive value -- varies in degree and kind
with the sentence meaning and varies further with each person's own cognitive history
with the terms of the sentence. Put in the common parlance: the  connotations of words
and sentence vary even among people who state the same facts with the same words and
sentences. Some interceptions are alleged to be uninformative to any competent user of
the terms. But such competence comes in kinds and degrees, and varies with what you
know or  believe  about  the  terms'  extensions. What  is  informative  for  one  competent
speaker may seem uninformative to another depending on their linguistic, conceptual and
empirical beliefs.13
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 Frege assimilated facts to propositions. Russell effectively did the same by assimilating propositions to 
facts, by conceiving of propositions as being constituted by the objects and properties they were about. 
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 For further syntactic data, see Peterson, Fact Event Proposition.
10
 Only facts about language can be called language dependent.
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 We say: The fact that it's raining means that the river will rise, but not *In English, the fact that it's raining 
means that the river will rise.
12A theory of the language of science needs to conceive of terms, sentences and their meanings as having 
enough constancy for our utterances to have logical inter-relations, formal entailments and contradictions, 
so what you assert I may affirm or deny, prove or disprove.  
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 Understanding comes in kinds and degrees, so requirements for understanding are problematic. A speaker
needs beliefs about her terms, their line of usage, the type they token. She needs no knowledge or de re 
belief about a term's denotation, not per se. Her key semantic beliefs about a term may be merely that 
someone uttered it and she uses it as they do, to say (designate or predicate) whatever they do. But she can't
much mimic another's meanings without beliefs about what they might be. And if no one harbors de re 
beliefs about a referent, there's no meaning for anyone to mean. So, the reference of our terms is tied, 
directly or indirectly, to beliefs about their referents. No term can be competently used without a great 
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Still, any synomic interception is somewhat informative if only because its truth
evidences and is explained by the fact of term synonymy, a contingency not knowable a
priori. Here it matters not whether the term synonymy qualifies as a linguistic rule, or
how speakers learn the fact of term synonymy, or how much extralinguistic knowledge is
involved. Suffice that the semantic fact behind the synomic interception be a empirical
contingency knowable only a posteriori while the counterpart semantic identity within a
logical  truth  is  itself  a  logical  truth,  like  The meaning of  'Greeks'  is  the meaning of
'Greeks', a  truth  knowable  a priori,  without  knowing  the  meaning  of  Greeks or  the
meaning of 'Greeks'.14 
All the informativeness of  Being Grecian is being Hellenic is explained by the
informativeness  of  its  implicit  contingent  term  synonymy  claim.  That's  because  the
semantic  fact  is  evidenced  by  and  entirely  explains  the  truth  and  necessity  of
interceptions  having  this  syntax.  Some  kind  of  understanding  and  knowledge  of  the
semantic  fact  and its  explanatory  role  is  essential  and  enough  for  understanding and
knowing the interception's truth. 
Yet,  synomic  interceptions  have  the  grammar  of  objectual  truths.  Their  terms
must function and refer as elsewhere if  Hellenes are mortal  is formally deducible from
Greeks are Hellenes and Greeks are mortal. So the fact the interception states cannot in
any way imply the semantic fact or any linguistic fact. Still, the interception neither states
nor implies any extra-linguistic fact beyond those implied by the semantic fact of term
synonym. Given the contingency of the semantic fact and the necessity the interception
states, the truth of the biconditional:
For Greece to be beautiful is for Hellas to beautiful iff 
the meaning of 'Greece' is the meaning of 'Hellas'
may seem an impossibility, when actually it's a metalinguistic or metalogical necessity. It
is so on its standard default reading which demands that each displayed term be a replica
of its undisplayed instance in the sentence, so the possibility of either symbol meaning
something else elsewhere is irrelevant. However the world might have been, necessarily,
Greece is Hellas and necessarily Greece means Greece, and Hellas means Hellas, so the
meaning of Greece must perforce be the meaning of Hellas.15
Principles like, The expression, 'E' means E, are basic necessary truths. Put aside
whether  this  is  a  metalogical  necessity  explained  by  the  sentence  representing  the
peculiar  logico-syntactic  form  of  semantic  statements  or  it  is  another  kind  of
network of beliefs about the world, and no principled distinction between linguistic and extra-linguistic 
beliefs explains your own usage of 'Greece' and 'Hellas' or 'Greeks' and 'Hellenes', let alone our common 
usage of those terms. Yet Quine was Kripkean in thinking that the informativeness of alter-identity truths is
measured by the extralinguistic knowledge required for their verification (see Methods of Logic).
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 This holds however tight an interception's term synonymy, which may be that of a term and its 
abbreviation, which, by definition, is simply a shorter symbol assigned the very same meaning. Frege used 
the epistemic difference between the a priori 'Ateb is Ateb' and the a posteriori 'Ateb is Afla' as evidence of a 
semantic difference, but not as a prerequisite of it. He recognizes that despite being synthetic a priori, a 
geometric interception differs semantically from its logical correlative. The arithmetic interceptions he thinks are 
analytic, a priori truths especially press the puzzle upon Frege. In any case, the semantic identity of an 
interception's terms is knowable only a posteriori.
15
 In other words, if the singular descriptions of The meaning of 'Greece' is the meaning of 'Hellas' are read,
not as predicates but as rigid designators so the sentence has the form, g=h, the sentence states a necessary 
truth, a synomic interception of the logical truth, The meaning of 'Greece' is the meaning of 'Greece'.
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metalinguistic necessity explained another way. In any case, we may reserve the term
entailment for implications between object level statements explained by their grammar,
and thus we may deny that the interception's truth entails the semantic fact. Let's call the
implications  between  an  object  level  sentence  and  its  metalinguistic  correlatives
metailments.  We  may  say  that  the  fact  of  term  synonymy  metails  that  nonuniform
substitution of the terms in a logical truth yields an extralogical necessary truth. In any
case, for you to mean or state that Greece is Hellas by uttering,  Greece is Hellas, you
must mean Greece by 'Greece' and Hellas by 'Hellas'. You must in some sense mean that
those terms are coreferential.
Again,  logical  truths and their  synomic interceptions differ  in logical  form, so
their metailments differ  in their logical  form and in their  modality,  so their  semantic
content differs, and with that their cognitive content. So their translations differ. Again,
forget  all  the  many  doubts  surrounding  translation.  Such  complexities  as  the  inter-
language use of proper names don’t matter. Suffice that interceptions aren't translated by
logical truths. Also irrelevant are Quinean cavils about translation. The translation issue
here  concerns  replicating  a  sentence's  logical  form  in  another  language,  and  Quine
concedes that a sentence's logical form is identifiable with that of a sentence of another
language. Otherwise inter-language sentence translation couldn't proceed at all. 
The Langford-Church prohibition of translating displayed material (what theorists
have mislabeled quotations) would be relevant only if sentence-embedded displays were
singular terms, but as explained in my paper for the Society of Exact Philosophy meeting,
they  aren't,  so  Church's  strictures  are  unsustainable.  It  is  formally  permissible  and
normally mandatory to translate 'Blood is red' says that blood is red as 'Blut ist rot' ist
sagt dass Blut ist rot. Church's denials of this are refuted by their own translations, which
become unintelligible if rendered according to his rules. 
Confusing displays with singular terms, facts with truths, and factual content with
with  semantic  content  are  among  the  many  confusions  sustaining  the  Frege-Russell
postulate  of  propositional  sameness  of  logical  truths  and their  synomic  interceptions.
Perhaps  the  deepest  confusion  is  that  of  regarding  logical  form  as  an  attribute  of
propositions and facts rather than sentences.  Frege sorely suffered from the confusion he
faulted  others  for,  the  confusion  of  sign  and  signified,  expression  and  expressed.  He
conceived of the logical structure of a sentence as serving to picture a logical structure we
discover in a language-independent thought (proposition).  His Begriffsschrift aspired to be
but a means of perspicuously representing the form and content already existing in abstract,
pre-notational propositions. Accordingly, if 'a' and 'b' represent the same thought content, the
logical form of the thought represented by the sentence a=b must be a=a.
Frege's  Begriffsschrift 'Preface' announces, without comment, his abandoning the
classical notion of logical truth as formal in the sense of independent of term meanings, and
replacing  it  with  the  formally  far  thinner  notion  of  independence  of  'the  particular
characteristics of things (Dinge).'16 He never retracted this conception of logical form, so
never recognized the semantic import of logical syntax. He and Russell and others haven't
appreciated that the distinctive form of logical truths cannot be represented or exemplified
except by sentences with recurring signs. Any other means of securing recurrence of symbol
16Cf. 'Compound Thoughts' in Brian McGuinness, ed., Gottlob Frege: Collected Papers (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1984) 390.
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meaning is extra-syntactical. His conception cannot make sense of logical truth, and if logical
validity is the logical truth of a conditional it cannot make sense of logical validity.
Recognizing the significance  of  sign  recurrence  is  essential,  but  it's  not  enough.
Making good sense of sentence nonsynonymy here requires rethinking our ideas of sentence
meaning and semantic content. Despite their great attractions, analyses of sentence meaning
as conditions of truth or verification or assertability are unsatisfactory for various well known
reasons. In particular, they don't well explain how, in telling you  Greece is Hellas, I can
mean to tell you that these terms are coreferential and succeed in telling you precisely that,
whereas in telling you 'Greece is Greece', I don't tell you or mean to tell you that the two
replicas of the term are coreferential.
An  alternative  worth  considering  is  to  emphasize  the  correlativity  of  sentence
meaning as correlative with understanding, and thereby to link meaning with what provides
understanding: to wit, an explanation. Elsewhere and in general, understanding -- why this
happened, how that is done, where things went wrong -- comes by grasping an explanation of
the matter.  'Explain'  and 'understand'  are  syntactic  correlatives:  their  primary objects are
interrogative  Wh-S  complements.  When  we  understand  a  sentence,  when  we  grasp  its
meaning, what we grasp is an explanation. What we grasp is not just the statement a sentence
makes -- indeed we dont much talk of grasping statements per se -- but an explanation of the
sentence's making that statement. We grasp a construction of the truth evaluable content from
the syntactically structured semantic components. The constructional facts explain what is
asserted and may be metailed by the assertion but aren't  stated in or entailed by what is
asserted.
The semantic content of a synthetic predication explains its factual content but not
its  truth  value.  The  linguistic  facts  explaining  what  statement  is  made don't  imply the
statement's  truth,  let  alone  explain  why  it  is  true.  Here  truth  is  consequent  upon  an
extrasentential, representation-independent reality. So stating the fact asserted suffices for
stating  the  sentence's  meaning.  Semantic  content  may  here  be  identified  with  factual
content.
Logical truths and synomic interceptions are grammatically no less objectual, but
while objectual reference remains, here it idles. In synomic interceptions, the explanatory
import of objectual representation is preempted by the fact of synonymy. The extra-linguistic,
language-independent features of the terms' extension are rendered irrelevant to the truth and
necessity of the interception, as are all the extralinguistic facts of the world. 
Logical truths are characterized by a third kind of explanation, truth solely by logic-
syntactic form As in synomic interceptions, the term meanings fix the sentence's objectual
reference,  but  the explanatory import  of  such reference  is  pre-empted by the sentence's
syntax. So, unlike synomic interceptions, here the contingencies of term semantics are also
irrelevant.  Suffice  that  tokens  of  a  sign  are  synonyms.  That  condition  is  no  semantic
contingency  or  extra-syntactic  assumption.  This  helps  explain  why  metalogical  or
metalinguistic truths like 'Blood is red' says that blood is red are properly translated by 'Blut
ist rot' sagt dass Blut ist rot. The apparent shift in objectual reference is insignificant, for here
the essential determinant of objectual reference is that the displayed expression replicate its
undisplayed version to preserve logical form.  
We all experience a profound alteration of our understanding of an utterance when
we see it  is  no substantive synthetic  statement  but  rather  a  logical  truth  or  a  synomic
interception. If it's a logical truth, what it says about its subject is equally true of anything, so
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it doesn't distinguish that subject from anything else.  If it's a synomic interception, what it
says about its subject is true only because of the terms used, so it doesn't state any language-
independent features of its subject. Conversely, we experience no less a conceptual gestalt
switch  when we see  that  a  seeming logical  truth  or  synomic  interception  is  actually  a
synthetic claim – when, for example, we realize that a seemingly valid deductive argument
is a conditional whose consequent might be false despite its antecedent's truth.
Consider: All of our statements are subject to the principles of modal logic and must
be understood accordingly. We hear modality in utterances like If you're a Greek you must
be a Hellene, and also, if less plainly, in utterances like To be Grecian just is to be Hellenic.
We may hear a claim of necessity even in utterances like Everything Grecian is Hellenic but
here a speaker may or may not mean to be making any claim of necessity. When someone
means to be uttering a logical truth or synomic interception, she means to be asserting a
necessity  –  and  she  is.  A  semantic  theory  might  assign  such  matters  to  the  speaker's
utterance meaning, something distinct from the abstract sentence meaning. Still, we might
best  regard  sentences  lacking  explicit  markings  of  modality  as  having  an  unspecified
modality. Perhaps utterances of You will leave this house immediately have a default reading
as statements of flat actuality, and any compulsion or necessity we sense is inserted by the
speaker. Suffice that in all or most languages, taken abstractly such sentences have available
alternative modal readings.
An utterance's semantic content alters when read as a necessity, and alters further
with the kind of necessity intended, for that fixes the intended range of possible objects of
reference,  and  thus  the  factual  content.  The  necessities  of  logical  truths  and  synomic
interceptions aren't distinguished extensionally, for their correspondent fact is the same, but
their semantic contents differ categorically because the explanations of those necessities
differ categorically.  
There is of course lots more that needs saying to make satisficing sense of a 
notion of sentence meaning as explanation. For one thing, synomic interceptions differ 
from interceptions by analytical definitions. The informativeness of synomic 
interceptions is explained by a notational coincidence, by another term naming the same 
concrete or abstract thing, so translations must use one of those terms. An analytic 
definiendum is no abbreviation of its analytic definiens, for the definiens analyzes and 
describes the property the definiendum names. Analytic definitions are fully translatable, 
notationally neutral substantive statements. Mathematical truths are still another separate 
category wrongly assimilated to synomic interceptions or interceptions of analytic 
definitions. The explanation of mathematical necessity is neither syntax, nor notational 
contingency, nor conceptual analysis. 
While much, much more is needed, perhaps enough has been said to begin to see 
some ramifications, for example some reasons for respecting the oft-repeated and 
routinely flouted linguistic intuition that sentence meanings are not properly called true or
false. If sentence meanings explain a sentence's making a specific truth claim they can't 
well themselves be that truth value bearer, so if propositions are truth bearers they can't 
well be sentence meanings. 
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